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1Revenue sharing is a controversial topic in the organization of any professional sport
league. In recent years, the importance of this topic has been made even more evident
by the growth in revenues American and European professional leagues fetch from the
television broadcasters.1 Not surprisingly, it has attracted the attention of professional
economists (see Fort and Quirk (1995) for a comprehensive review). Surprisingly, there is
few theoretical analysis of thedi®erent sides of thecontroversy. In an attempt to shed some
light on this issue, we study a dynamicmodel of tournament-like competition among teams
and we let the body organizing the competition decide how to award prizes to winners and
losers. In other words, we address the following question: how should a professional sport
league allocate revenues among participating teams?
The standard argument in favor of revenue sharing in sports observes that there are
largedi®erences among revenues and wealth of teams. For example, Scully (1995) and Fort
and Quirk (1995) provide evidenceon large disparities of revenues from local TV deals and
ticket sales among teams located in di®erent cities. As a consequence, richer teams tend to
be more successful.2 A mechanism which redistributes income from richer to poorer teams
makes the competition more balanced, hence more enjoyable to the fans. A consequence
of this argument is that revenue sharing increases demand for the sport, hence increasing
the revenues of the league. Furthermore, if teams are pro¯t maximizers, revenue sharing
also decreases the price teams pay for top players since their marginal value decreases.
Hence, revenue sharing has a positive impact on the pro¯t of teams. On the other hand,
revenuesharing provides little incentives to win. In theend, this may havea negativee®ect
on demand since the lack of incentives for team owners will induce lack of incentives for
players.3 Moreover, as noticed by Daly (1992) and Fort and Quirk (1995), if teams have
nothing to compete for, fans may strongly doubt the integrity of the competition on the
playing ¯eld with an obvious negative e®ect on demand. Hence, revenue sharing has a
negative impact of the team pro¯ts.
In this paper, we present a rigorous analysis of the opposing views in this controversy.
Our starting point is a description of aggregate demand for a sporting competition. This
determines how much money the league may obtain for selling the rights to broadcast
the event. Then the league chooses a monetary reward scheme, knowing that its choice
in°uences how team will compete in the event, hence in°uencing the aggregate demand.
Aggregate demand for a sport is ultimately determined by how much the fans enjoy the
show provided by thetournament in which theteamscompete. Following the literature sur-
1The latest reported television deals for NFL and NBA, for example, are $17.6 billion over eight years and
$2.4 billion over four years respectively (see Araton 1998).
2See Scully (1995) for detailed evidence in American professional leagues.
3An example of this e®ect is given by the higher TV ratings for playo® matches when compared to regular
season ones.
2veyed in Fort and Quirk (1995), we assume it depends on three factors. Quality of playing
talent in the sport, how hard teams are trying to prevail in the tournament, and competi-
tive balance in the tournament. The league's quality is measured by the combined wealth
of the participating teams; it re°ects the league's ability to attract talented athletes. The
environment in which the league operates strongly in°uences league-wide quality. While
US sport leagues are monopsonists in the market for players (i.e., only intra-league trades
are observed so that league-wide talent is constant), European sport leagues operate in a
competitiveenvironment and competefor top players (inter-league trades of top players are
as frequent as intra-league trades). A wealthier league (i.e., a larger total wealth of teams)
attracts better players, hence having a positive e®ect on demand. Willingness to win is
measured by the salaries a team pays to its Athletes. If the e®ort players produce is ob-
servable, a higher salary is theconsequence of a highere®ort. If thee®ort is not observable,
higher prizewhen winningthecompetition generatesa higher e®ort. Competitivebalanceis
measured by uncertainty of the outcome; fans enjoy sporting events whose winners are not
easy to predict. In other words, the more symmetric the winning chances of the teams, the
more exciting thetournament is to watch. Since a team's probability of winning ultimately
depends on the athletes playing for it, competitive balance also depends on a team's wealth
and how much it pays its athletes.
In a dynamic setting, revenue sharing has two e®ects on demand. The ¯rst e®ect we
call competitive balance: increased revenuesharing at time t increases demand at time t+1
by making the teams' future winning chances more equal. This e®ect has consequences
for the competitive balance at time t + 1 even if teams are equally wealthy at time t: a
large prize today introduces an asymmetry in the probabilities of winning tomorrow. The
second e®ect we call incentives to win: revenue sharing decreases demand by lowering the
gain teams may obtain from winning and consequently diminishing theire®ort to win. This
lowers demand since fans enjoy more e®ort from players.
In this paper, we are able to derive the optimal level of revenue sharing in a repeated
tournament by analyzing the trade-o® between competitive balance and incentives to win.
Weconsidertwo natural possibilitiesfortheobjectivefunction of a professional sport league.
First, we assume that the league as an independent body and assume it maximizes the
revenues given by the amount of money it can obtain from television broadcaster. In our
framework, this assumption is equivalent to maximizing demand for the sport. Second,
we consider the league as a cartel of pro¯t maximizing ¯rms and assume it maximizes the
teams' joint pro¯t (asassumed by Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988)). Underdemand
maximization, a performance-based reward scheme, as used by European top soccer leagues
for national TV deals (see Table 1), may be optimal4. Under joint pro¯ts maximization,
4See Hamil, Michie and Oughton (1999) for more details about England.
3full revenue sharing, as used by US team sport leagues for national TV deals, is always
optimal .
Our paper extends the existing literature5 in several ways. First, we consider a multi-
period model. Therefore, we are able to capture the trade-o® between pro¯ts today and
pro¯ts tomorrow generated by revenue sharing. Second, we consider the possibility that a
league faces competition from other leagues and that they compete for top players as is the
case in Europe. Existing studies of revenue sharing consider the case of US sport leagues
that do not face competition6 Therefore, we can study the in°uence of revenue sharing at
time t on league-wide talent at time t+1.
The analysis carried out in this paper goes beyond the sports literature. Our model
presents an example of a repeated moral-hazard problem between a principal and multiple
agents in which the di®erence in output produced by the agents is detrimental to the prin-
cipal and agents' income at time t in°uencestheirproductivity at time t+17 In this setting,
the principal faces a trade-o® between \output balance" among agents and incentives to
produce large quantities. In a dynamic model, a principal can \invest" in output balance,
i.e., lower the output at time t in order to get less di®erence in output at time t+1. Such
an investment is not possible in a static model.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and
Section 3 derives its equilibrium. Section 4 to 6 consider three possible extensions. These
are the problem of multi-period TV deals; the case in which teams have revenues that do
not depend on the leagues' sharing policy; the situation in which teams cannot observe
players e®ort (how hard they try to win). Finally, Section 6 concludes and an Appendix
contains all proofs.
1 The model
In this section, we present a very simple model of the interaction between teams, leagues,
and broadcasters. Many simplifying assumptions are made only to obtain a closed form
solution of the model and do not appear necessary for our qualitative results. We study a
two period game with four players. These are a professional sport league, the two teams
5El Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988), Fort and Quirk (1995), and Hoen and
Szymanski (1999), Vrooman (1999).
6Hoen and Szymanski (1999) also compare a league operating in a competitive environment and an isolated
one. However, they do not study the optimal level of revenue sharing.
7For example, consider a situation such that there are two agents 1 and 2, the income of the principal at time
t is Min(qt;1;qt;2), qt;i being the output of agent i at time t. Moreover, qt;i depends on agent i's (unobservable)
e®ort, his productivity and some noise, and the productivity at time t depends on past income. (One can think
of productivity as being the consequence of investment in more or less sophisticated machines.)
4competing in a tournament this league organizes, and a broadcaster who pays to show this
tournament to its viewers. In each period, the following sequence of moves occurs. First,
the broadcaster decides how much to pay for the exclusive right to televise the sporting
event. Then, the league decides how to divide this money between loser and winner of
the tournament. Finally, the teams simultaneously decide how much to spend on players'
incentives. At theend of period, thetournament isplayed, winner and loser aredetermined,
and money is awarded.
Let Kt be the amount paid by the broadcaster in period t. Denote Wt;i and et;i the
wealth of team at the beginning of period t and the e®ort exerted by team i at time t,
respectively. The initial wealth of teams 1 and 2 areW1;1 and W1;2, respectively. Wealth at
the beginning of period two is represented by the sum of the initial wealth and the pro¯ts
realized in period 1.
The probability of winning the tournament
The outcome of the sporting event depends on the e®ort choices of the two teams and on
their initial ability. The probability that team i wins in period t depends on its players'
talent and how hard they play. Talent can bethought of asa team'sability to sign playersat
the beginning of the season and is measured by the team's wealth Wt;i. How hard players
try to win can be thought of as e®ort, and is measured by the incentives necessary for
players to perform during the season et;i. Formally, we assume the probability that team i
wins in period t is
pt;i =®
et;i
et;i+et;j +¯
Wt;i
Wt;i+Wt;j if et;i +et;j >0
pt;i =
Wt;i
Wt;i+Wt;j if et;i +et;j =0
with ® + ¯ = 1 and i 6= j. Quite obviously, pt;j = (1¡pt;i) since there are only two
teams. The probability of winning increases with the di®erence in e®ort and the di®erence
in wealth. When the two teams are equally wealthy and produce the same e®ort level,
their probability of winning is 1
2. One can think of ®
¯ as a rough measure of how winning
depends on incentives relative to initial quality. If ®
¯ > 1 the marginal return to e®ort
is higher than the marginal return to wealth. Loosely speaking, in this case `trying hard
is more important than being better'. The probability function we choose captures the
following idea in a simple fashion. A richer team can buy better players, hence having
an initial advantage. However, a poorer team can compensate this initial disadvantage by
producing a higher e®ort level. In order to make players to produce a higher e®ort level,
teams must reward them. Here, the e®ort level is measured in monetary terms.
5Demand
Fans preferences determinehow much they enjoy the show provided by the tournament the
teamsplay. Weassumethesepreferences depend on threesetsof variables: overall quality of
theleague, competitivebalancein the tournament, how hard players aretrying to prevail in
thecompetition. Theleague's quality is measured by thewealth of the participating teams;
this re°ects their ability to attract talented athletes. Competitive balance is measured
by uncertainty of the outcome; fans enjoy sporting events whose winners are not easy to
predict. The more competitive the league, the more symmetric the winning chances of the
two teams, the more exciting the tournament is to follow. Willingness to win is measured
by players' e®ort; it is important because fans enjoy athletes playing hard.8
In each period t, we assume a simple speci¯cation of demand in monetary terms Dt.
Demand for sport by fans in period t is:
Dt =°(et;1 +et;2) +±[1 ¡(pt;1 ¡pt;2)2] +º(Wt;1 +Wt;2) (1)
where et;i denotes team i's e®ort in period t, pt;i its probability of winning, Wt;i its wealth;
theparameters ° 2 (0;1) and º 2 (0; 1) are coe±cientswhile± > 0 isexpressed in monetary
term. It represents the monetary value of one unit of competitive balance. Equation (1)
can loosely be interpreted as measuring fans welfare from watching the tournament. The
¯rst term measures the importance of watching athletes \giving their best", the second
measures the importance of watching a competitive tournament, and the third measures
theimportance of watching talented athletes. Forthis last term, the idea is that if there are
several competing leagues, league-wide talent depends on the total wealth of teams9. The
wealthier the teams of the considered league, the more talented the players they attract.
Since demand is expressed in monetary terms, the idea is that the broadcast of games
generates income from say advertising and this income increases with the audience that
watches them.
Themarket forTV rights isassumed to beperfectly competitivei.e., broadcastersexpect
zero pro¯ts in equilibrium and, in period 1, they expect to get the rights to broadcast the
game in period 2 with probability zero. Hence, in each period, we have Kt =Dt.
8A possible fourth set of variables may measure fans' attachment to a team. Since we model demand for the
sport, we assume that these \individual team" e®ects wash out in the aggregate.
9This assumption corresponds to the case of European sport leagues who organize domestic competitions and
sign TV deals with national broadcasters. Top players often switch from one league to another, hence changing
league-wide talents. Conversely, US sport leagues are in an isolated environment where league-wide talent is given
and only intra-league trades occur.
61.0.1 The league
After having received Kt from broadcasters, the league decide how to allocate it between
the two team at the end of the competition. We denote Kt;w and Kt;l (Kt;w +Kt;l = Kt)
the amounts allocated to the winner and the loser, respectively, in period t. We consider
two possible objective functions for the league.
Assumption (D) The league maximizes the demand for sport. Given that assumption of
perfect competition in the broadcasting industry, this is equivalent to assuming that the
league maximizes the revenues from the sale of TV rights. Hence, theleague maximizes K2
in period 2 and K1 +K2 in period 1.
Assumption (JP) The league maximizes the joint pro¯t of the teams.
The Teams
The teams compete in a tournament whose outcome is uncertain. Since the probability of
winning and the revenue to be allocated between teams in period 2 depends on the outcome
of period 1. Hence, a fully rational team should consider the in°uence of its strategy in
period 1 on the game that will be played in period 2. We do not think that this is very
realisticsincea leagueisusually madeofa relatively largenumberof teamsand thestrategic
in°uence of a speci¯c team on the revenue of the league in the following period is small.
Therefore, we start by considering the behavior of myopic teams.10 Formally, a team's
pro¯ts are:
¼i;t =pt;iKt;w +(1 ¡pt;i)Kt;l ¡c(et;i)
Since e®ort is measured in monetary terms, we assume the cost function of e®ort in each
period is given by c(e) =e.
Finally, two remarks should be made. First, our model concentrates on the sale of
rights to national TV network and on the allocation of these revenue between teams. Of
course, teams have other sources of pro¯ts (e.g., ticket sales, sponsoring, merchandising,
local TV deals). In the model, this is captured by the di®erence in initial wealth and this
is assumed to be constant over the two periods. An alternative view is that the league
is able to centralize all the revenues generated by teams and to redistribute Second, we
have not modeled a market for talent. Implicitly, we assume that talent is linear in price
and that teams maximize their expected pro¯t from talent under the constraint that they
cannot borrow. In such a case, if for a cost of talent equal to the total wealth of a team,
the marginal pro¯t is larger than the marginal cost, teams invest their entire wealth.
10The case of fully rational teams is analyzed in the Appendix.
72 The Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize theequilibrium of the game described previously. We begin
by analyzing thesubgamestarting at thebeginning of period 2. Thesolution concept weuse
is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Applying backward induction, westart with period 2
subgame and look at three optimization problems. First, the teams' optimal e®ort choices,
given their wealth, the prizes decided by the league, and the TV rights. Then, the league
optimal prize choice, given the TV rights, and the teams' equilibrium play that follows.
Finally, the broadcaster optimal TV rights choice, given teams' and league equilibrium
play. Then, we repeat a similar procedure for period 1, considering equilibrium play in the
following period.
2.1 Period 2 Subgame
Formally, in period 2, team i maximizes
¦i;2 =pi;2K2;w +(1 ¡pi;2)K2;l ¡ei;2 (2)
Let ¢K2 =K2;w ¡K2;l. We have the following result.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium of the e®ort game such that
e2;1 =e2;2 =
®¢K2
4
(3)
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 says that the e®ort produced by teams increases with the di®erence between
the prizemoney going to the winner and theloser. Hence, the largerthe amount of revenue
sharing (i.e., thesmaller ¢K2), the smaller the e®ort level produced by teams. We can now
turn to the problem of the league.
The league maximizes demand for sport
Under the assumption that the league maximizes the demand for sport, the problem of the
league in period 2 is equivalent to choosing ¢K2 so as to maximize the e®ort produced by
teams under the constraint that teams do not make losses. This implies that K2;l ¸ e2;i.
We derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that the league maximizes the demand for sport, then
¢K2 =
K2
1 +®=2
(4)
8Proof: see Appendix.
This result states that when thedemand for sport depends on the e®ort produced by team,
full revenue sharing does not lead to the maximization of demand for sport in the last
period. The league always provides incentives for teams to produce e®ort. Hence ¢K2 > 0
in equilibrium.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we can write the demand in period 2 as a function of K2.
Furthermore, the assumption of perfect competition in the broadcasting industry implies
that D2 =K2. Therefore, we derive the revenue K2(d) of the league in period 2:
K2(d) =
±(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)
￿
1¡¯2(W2;1 ¡W2;2)2
(W2;1 +W2;2)2
¸
+
º(2+®)
2 +®(1 ¡°)
(W2;1 +W2;2) (5)
The league maximizes teams' joint pro¯t
The joint pro¯t of teams in period 2 (¦2) is given by
¦2 =(°¡1)(e2;1 +e2;2) +±
￿
1¡¯2(W2;1 ¡W2;2)2
(W2;1 +W2;2)2
¸
+º(W2;1 +W2;2) (6)
It is straightforward that ¦2 is decreasing in the e®ort level. Therefore, the objective of
the league is to minimize the e®ort level produced by teams. Hence, we have the following
result.
Proposition 3 Assume that the league maximizes teams' joint pro¯t. Then, the league
chooses full revenue sharing, i.e., ¢K2 =0.
It follows that the revenue of the league in period 2 is
K2(jp) =±
￿
1 ¡¯2(W2;1 ¡W2;2)2
(W2;1 +W2;2)2
¸
+º(W2;1 +W2;2) (7)
2.2 Period 1 Behavior and the Equilibrium of the Game
Given that teams are myopic, the problem they face in period 1 is identical to that faced
in period 2. Hence, substituting ¢K2 and K2;l by ¢K1 and K1;l, respectively, Proposition
1 still holds. Therefore, we can study directly the problem of the league. Given that the
league is fully rational, it takes into account the in°uence of its decision in period on the
game played in period 2. Furthermore, there is uncertainty about the payo®s in period 2
since W2;1 and W2;2 are dependent of the outcome of the competitions between the teams
in period 1.
9The league maximizes demand for sport
From Proposition 1, we deduce that the revenue of the league in period 2 if team 1 wins in
period 1 is
K¤
2(d; 1) =
±(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)
h
1¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2+¢K1)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡(e1;1+e1;2))2
i
+
º(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1 ¡(e1;1 +e1;2))
while the revenue of the league in period 2 if team 2 wins in period 1 is
K¤
2(d; 2) =
±(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)
h
1¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2¡¢K1)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡(e1;1+e1;2))2
i
+
º(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1 ¡(e1;1 +e1;2))
Therefore, in period 1, the league maximizes
D = D1 +p1;1K¤
2(d; 1) +(1¡p1;1)K¤
2(d;2) (8)
Given that the two teams produce the same e®ort in period 1, we deduce that
p1;1 =
®
2
+¯
W1;1
W1;1 +W1;2
(9)
and
D1 =°(e1;1 +e1;2) +±
￿
1 ¡¯2(W1;1 ¡W1;2)2
(W1;1 +W1;2)2
¸
+º(W1;1 +W1;2) (10)
From equations (9) and (10), we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume the league maximizes the demand for sport. Then:
(i) If °(3¡°) >3º, there exists ® <1 such that for all ®>®, ¢K1 > 0.
(ii) if °(3¡°) <3º, full revenue sharing is optimal, i.e., ¢K1 =0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The level of revenue sharing chosen by the league in period 1 in°uences its revenue in
three ways. As the level of revenue sharing increases (¢K1 decreases), ¯rst, the revenue
in period 1 decreases through a lower e®ort produced by teams. Second, the revenue of
period 2 increases through a largertotal wealth, and third, the revenueof period 2 increases
through an increase in the balancedness of the league (jp2;1 ¡p2;2j increases). Part (i) of
the proposition states that when the sensitivity of demand to e®ort is large relative to the
sensitivity of demand to total wealth (so that °(3 ¡°) > 3º), then if the sensitivity of
the probability of winning to e®ort (®) is large enough the league sets the level of revenue
sharing so as to maximize the e®ort level produced by teams. Hence, the league chooses
partial revenue sharing (¢K1 >0). Part (ii) states that when the sensitivity of demand to
wealth is large (so that °(3 ¡°) < 3º) then the league shares its revenue evenly between
teams in order to maximize the total wealth in period 2, hence the demand in period 2.
10The league maximizes teams' joint pro¯ts
We know that when the league maximizes teams' joint pro¯t, it sets ¢K2 = 0, so that
e2;1 = e2;2 = 0. It follows that if team 1 wins in period 1, the revenue of the league in
period 2 is
K¤
2(jp;1) = ±
￿
1¡¯2 (W1;1 ¡W1;2 +¢K1)2
(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1 ¡(e1;1 +e1;2))2
¸
+º(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡(e1;1+e1;2))
while if team 2 wins in period 1, the revenue of the league in period 2 is
K¤
2(jp;2) = ±
￿
1¡¯2 (W1;1 ¡W1;2 ¡¢K1)2
(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1 ¡(e1;1 +e1;2))2
¸
+º(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡(e1;1+e1;2))
The objective of the league in period 1 is then to maximize
¦ =D1 +p1;1K¤
2(jp; 1) +(1¡p1;1)K¤
2(jp; 2) ¡(e1;1 +e1;2) (11)
Given the e®ort level chosen by teams as a function of K1;w and K1;l, we have thefollowing
result.
Proposition 5 Assume that the league maximizes the joint pro¯t of the teams. Then, full
revenue sharing is optimal, i.e., ¢K1 =0.
Proof: Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 4, one shows that @¦=@¢K1 <0. 2
The proposition states that the cost of an increase of the demand through a higher e®ort
produced by teams is o®set by the cost of such an e®ort. Hence, the league chooses ¢K1
so that teams minimize their e®ort level.
3 Multi-period TV deal
So far, we have assumed that, at the beginning of each period, TV deals are negotiated for
oneperiod. Now, weconsider thecasein which at thebeginning of period 1, theleaguesells
the right to broadcast games for thetwo seasons and the payment is made at the beginning
of period 1. In such a case, the league decides two things: the allocation of prizes between
periods and then the allocation between the winner and the loser in each period. Such an
assumption has two implications. First, at the beginning of period 1, teams know prizes to
be awarded in the second period. This was not thecase before since the K2 was dependent
of the winning team in the ¯rst period. Second, we do not have Dt =Kt, (t =1; 2). If we
denote K the revenue of the league at the beginning of period 1, K = D1 +D2.
Also, note that the problem faced by teams in each period remains unchanged. Hence, the
e®ort levels in periods 1and 2 remain unchanged asfunctionsof ¢K1 and ¢K2, respectively.
11If the league maximizes the demand for sport, we are able to derive solutions in the corner
cases ® = 0 and ® = 1. When the league maximizes teams' joint pro¯ts, we have a more
general result.
Proposition 6 (i) Assume that the league maximizes the demand for sport. If ® =1 and
° > º then K1 = K, K2 = 0, and ¢K1 = 2K1=3. If ® = 1 and ° < º then K1 = K,
K2 =0 and ¢K1 =0. If ®= 0, then K1 =K, K2 =0 and ¢K1 =0.
(ii) Assume that the league maximizes teams' joint pro¯ts. Then, K1;w = K1;l =K=2 and
K2 =0.
Proof: See Appendix.
When deciding how to allocate money between teams and between periods, the league has
to take into account two typesof e®ects. First, the importancesensitivity of theprobability
of winning to e®ort (®) relative to its sensitivity to wealth (¯). As already mentioned, the
larger ®, the larger the e®ort level produced by teams. The second e®ect is theimportance
of the sensitivity of demand to e®ort (°) relative to the sensitivity of demand to wealth
(º). For a given total e®ort produced by teams in the two periods, the league prefers to
concentrate these e®orts in period 1 since it generates an increase in total wealth in period
2. Hence, for any ® the league encourages e®ort in period 1. Also, for a given ¢K1, the
larger K1 the smaller the di®erence in relative wealth between the two teams in period 2,
hence the more balanced the competition. For these two reasons, the league sets K2 = 0.
When ® is large, the choice of ¢K1 for a given K1 depends on the values of ° and º. The
league faces a trade-o®. If ¢K1 is large, then teams produce a high e®ort level in period
1 hence generating a high demand in period 1. In such a case, the total pro¯t of teams is
small since teams face a high cost for such an e®ort level. It follows that the total wealth
in period 2 is small and so is the demand of period 2 generated by total wealth.
4 Teams have multiple sources of revenue
In this section, we assume that teams have revenues that are not submitted to possible
revenue sharing by the league. For example, these revenues may come from local TV deal
or from merchandising. However, we assume that these revenue are dependent of past
performance, the idea being that the better a team is performing, the more attractive it is,
hence the higher its revenue. Formally, we assume that the winner of the competition in
period t receives Kt;w +A with A strictly positiveand independent of thedegree of revenue
sharing chosen by the league. As before, the loser receives Kt;l. Under such an assumption
we have the following results.
12Proposition 7 Assume that the league maximize the demand for sport and let
A¤ =
2±
®(1¡°)
￿
1¡¯2(W2;1 ¡W2;2)2
(W2;1 +W2;2)2
¸
+
2º
®(1 ¡°)
(W2;1 +W2;2)
If A > A¤ then
K2 =
°®A
2
+±
￿
1¡¯2(W2;1 ¡W2;2)2
(W2;1 +W2;2)2
¸
+º(W2;1 +W2;2)
¢K2 =0 and e2;i = ®A=4 (i =1; 2). If A ￿ A¤ then
K2 =
°®A
2 +®(1 ¡°)
+
±(2 +®)
2+®(1¡°)
￿
1 ¡¯2(W2;1 ¡W2;2)2
(W2;1 +W2;2)2
¸
+
º(2 +®)
2+®(1 ¡°)
(W2;1 +W2;2)
¢K2 = 2K2¡®A
2+® e2;1 =e2;2 =®(¢K2 +A)=4
Proof: See Appendix.
When the additional source of revenue is not too large (i.e., smaller than A¤ so that the
league does not choose full revenue sharing), it generates a higher revenue for the league.
The reason is that A a®ects the e®ort level produced by teams in two ways. The ¯rst e®ect
is a direct one. If the amount earned by the winning team increases, it provides incentives
forteamsto increasetheire®ort level. Thisgeneratesan indirect e®ect: theleagueincreases
the level of revenue sharing so that
e2;i =K2;l =
®(K2 +A)
2(2 +®)
When the additional source of revenue is large (i.e., lager than A¤), the league chooses full
revenue sharing and teams' e®ort level is only determined by A. Furthermore, the losing
team makes a loss.
In period 1, the problem teams face is the same as in period 2. Therefore,
e1;1 =e1;2 = ®(¢K1 +A)=4 (12)
From Proposition 7 and equation (12), we deduce the following result.
Proposition 8 Assume that the league maximizes the demand for sport. If °(3¡°) >3º,
there exist ¹ A > 0 and ® <1 such that if A < ¹ A and ® >®, then ¢K1 > 0.
This result suggests that in a league in which revenues from TV deals represent a fraction
not too large of team revenues, full revenue sharing is not damaging to e®ort since other
source of revenues provide incentives for teams to produce e®ort. Conversely, in a league
in which revenues from TV represent a large fraction of teams' revenues, then the league
chooses a performance-based allocation.
135 Unobservable E®ort
So far, we have implicitly assumed that e®ort produced by team players was observable,
hence teams could o®er e®ort-based compensation to players. In this section, we relax this
assumption. A direct consequenceis that teams can only o®er performance-based contracts
to players. Let ¹t;i(w) and ¹t;i(l) the fraction of the gain paid to players when team i earns
Kt;w and Kt;l, respectively. The objective of team i is to maximize
¼t;i =pt;i(1¡¹t;i(w))Kt;w +(1 ¡pt;i)(1¡¹t;i(l))Kt;l
subject to ¹t;i(w) ¸ 0, ¹t;i(l) ¸ 0, and
e¤
t;i 2 Argmax pt;i¹t;i(w)Kt;w +(1¡pt;i)¹t;i(l)Kt;l (13)
This last equation represents the incentive compatibility constraint.
Let ¢Kt;i = ¹t;i(w)Kt;w ¡¹t;i(l)Kt;l. Then, proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1,
one shows that the equilibrium of the e®ort game is such that
e¤
t;i =Sup
½
0;
®(¢Kt;i)2¢Kt;j
(¢Kt;1 +¢Kt;2)2
¾
(14)
with i 6= j. It follows that if e¤
t;i >0, then
pt;i = ®
¢Kt;i
¢Kt;1 +¢Kt;2
+¯
Wt;i
Wt;1 +Wt;2
(15)
From these results, we derive the following proposition about the compensation of players
by teams.
Proposition 9 Assume that ¢Kt >0. There exists an equilibrium such that
(i) ¹t;i(l) = 0 (i =1;2)
(ii) If Wt;i >Wt;j, then 0 <¹t;i(w) <¹t;j(w) and pt;i >pt;j.
(iii) ¹t;I (i = 1; 2) is an increasing function of Kt;w.
We deduce that
e¤
t;i =
®¹t;i(w)2¹t;j(w)Kt;w
(¹t;1(w) +¹t;2(w))2
and
pt;i =®
¹t;i(w)
¹t;1(w) +¹t;2(w)
+¯
Wt;i
Wt;1 +Wt;2
Theproposition saysthat players areonly compensated in caseof success and theincentives
are more important for the team with the smaller wealth. It follows that players from the
wealthier team exert a lower e®ort. However, in equilibrium, the wealthier team has a
14higher probability of winning the competition. A direct consequence of (iii) is that the
level of revenue sharing in°uences the e®ort level produced by teams in two ways: directly
through the di®erence of gains between the winner and the loser, and indirectly through
the compensation scheme of the players (¹t;i(w)).
We turn now to the problem of the league. A main di®erences with the case of observable
e®ort is that teams never make losses. Hence, in period 1, the league does not have to take
into account the possibility that a team will have a negative wealth if it loses in period 1.
From the previous proposition we derive the following results about the level of revenue
sharing in period 2.
Proposition 10 Assume that the league maximizes the demand for sport. Then:
(i) ¢K2 =K2.
(ii) There exists ® <1 such that if ®>® and °(6 ¡°) > 36º then ¢K1 >0.
The proposition states that, qualitatively, the results obtained in the case of observable
e®ort still hold if this assumption is relaxed. That is, the league minimizes the level of
revenue sharing in the second period and if the in°uence of e®ort on demand is large
enough with respect to the in°uence of total wealth, then the league does not choose full
revenue sharing in the ¯rst period.
6 Conclusions
We presented a theoretical model of revenue sharing in sport leagues. Our main results
derive explicit conditions under which revenue sharing may be optimal. These can be
summarized by looking at the relative importance of the incentive to win versus (future)
competitive balance. Higher revenues sharing increases future demand through a better
competitive balance, but decreases current demand through a lower e®ort to win from
teams. If the league maximizes the demand for sport, then a performance-based reward
scheme (as used by European top soccer leagues for national TV deals) may be optimal.
Conversely, if theleagueact asa cartel and maximizesjoint pro¯ts, then full revenuesharing
(as used by US team sport leagues for national TV deals) is always optimal .
Our results are also interesting for the moral-hazard literature since our model presents
an exampleof a repeated agency problem between a principal and multipleagents in which
the di®erence in output produced by the agents is detrimental to the principal. In this
setting, the principal faces a trade-o® between \output balance" among agents and incen-
tives to producelargequantities. Our results show that theprincipal may have incentive to
\invest" in \output balance", i.e., lower the output today in order to get a lower di®erence
in outputs tomorrow.
15Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume that ¢K2 > 0. If e2;j > 0 then the FOC of pro¯t
maximization for player i yields
e2;i =Max
³
0;
p
®e2;j¢K2 ¡e2;j
´
(16)
and if e2;j = 0 then e2;i =0 is not a best reply to e2;j. Therefore, equilibria are solution of
the system of equation (16) A solution is given by (26). If ¢K2 =0, then teams' expected
revenue is independent of their e®ort level. Hence, teams' objective is to minimize the cost
of e®ort, thus they choose e2;i = 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 2: Given that K2;l = K2 ¡K2;w, ¢K2 = 2K2;w ¡K2 and the
demand for sport, the problem of the league is to choose K2;w so as to maximize the e®ort
produced by teams. From Proposition 1, we derive that the league choose K2;w such that
K2 ¡K2;w = ®2K2;w ¡K2=4 (17)
Hence,
K2;w =
1+®=4
1+®=2
K2 (18)
This implies
¢K2 =
K2
1 +®=2
(19)
Proof of Proposition 4: Let
H =
¢K1
³
(W1;1 +W1;2) +
®¯(W1;1¡W1;2)2
2(W1;1+W1;2)
´
+(¯ +®=2)(W1;1 ¡W1;2)2
(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1 ¡®¢K1=2)3
@D
@¢K1
= ¡2¯2±(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)
H +
®
2
µ
° ¡
º(2 +®)
2+®(1¡°)
¶
If °(3 ¡°) > 3º, then there exists ® < 1 such that for all ® > ®, @D
@K1 > 0. Conversely, if
°(3 ¡°) ￿ 3º, then for all ®2 [0;1] @D=@¢K1 < 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 6: Assume that the league maximizes the demand for sport. If
® =1, then the league maximizes
D =
(° ¡º)
2
¢K1 +
°
2
¢K2 +2[±+º(W1;1 +W1;2)] +ºK1 (20)
subject to K =K1 +K2, ¢Kt ￿ Kt;l (t = 1; 2).
If º > °, then D is decreasing in ¢K1 and increasing in ¢K2. Hence, the league sets
16¢K1 = 0 and ¢K2=4 =K2;l. Therefore, K1;w =K1;l = K1=2, and K2;l =K2=4. It follows
that the problem of the league is to choose K1 and K2 (with K1 +K2 = K) so as to
maximize D =°K2=2 +ºK1. Given that º >°, the league chooses K1 = K and K2 =0.
Now, assume that ° > º. Then, the league sets ¢K1=4 = K1;l and ¢K2=4 = K2;l. Then,
the league maximizes
D =((° +º)K1 +°K2)=2 (21)
We deduce that the league chooses K1 = K and K2 = 0. Furthermore, ¢K1=4 = K1;l
implies ¢K1 = 2K=3.
Assume that ® = 0. Then, the demand in period 1 is not in°uenced by the allocation
chosen by the league. It follows that the objective of the league is to maximize
F =
W1;1
W1;1+W1;2
h
1¡
(W1;1¡W1;2+¢K1)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1)2
i
+
W1;2
W1;1+W1;2
h
1 ¡
(W1;1¡W1;2¡¢K1)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1)2
i
+º(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1)
(22)
It is straightforward that F is increasing in K1. Hence, the league set K2 = 0. Now,
dF=d¢K1 >0 is equivalent to
¡2(W1;1 +W1;2)¢K1 ¡2(W1;1 ¡W1;2)2 < 0 (23)
Therefore, The league chooses ¢K1 = 0.
Assume that the league maximizes teams' joint pro¯t. Given that et;1 = et;2 = ®¢Kt=4,
the league maximizes
¦ =2(° ¡º ¡1)e1;1 +±
³
®
2 +¯
W1;1
W1;1+W1;2
´h
1 ¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2+¢K1)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡2e1;1)2
i
+±
³
®
2 +¯
W1;2
W1;1+W1;2
´h
1¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2¡¢K1)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡2e1;1)2
i
+2(° ¡1)e2;1 +ºK1
(24)
subject to K =K1 +K2, ¢Kt ￿ Kt;l (t = 1; 2).
It is straightforward that ¦ is decreasing in the e®ort in period 2. Hence the league sets
¢K2 =0. Now,
@¦
@¢K1 =®(° ¡º ¡1)=2 ¡
¯2f
®
2(®(W1;1¡W1;2)2+2¢K1(W1;1+W1;2+K1))g
(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡2e1;1)3
¡
¯2¢K1
W1;1+W1;2(K1(W1;1+W1;2)+(W1;1+W1;2)2+®
2(W1;1¡W1;2)2)
(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡2e1;1)3
¡
¯2(W1;1¡W1;2)2
µ
K1
W1;1+W1;2
+1+®
2
¶
(W1;1+W1;2+K1¡2e1;1)3 <0
(25)
Hence, ¢K1 = 0. Furthermore, it is straightforward that at ¢K1 = 0, @¦=@K1 >0 while
@¦=@K2 = 0. Hence, we have the desired result. 2
17Proof of Proposition 7: Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1, one shows that
e2;1 =e2;2 =
®(¢K2 +A)
4
(26)
Then, proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain that the league chooses
K2;w = Max
½
4K2 +®(K2 ¡A)
2(2+®)
;
K2
2
¾
(27)
This implies
¢K2 =Max
½
2K2 ¡®A
2+®
; 0
¾
(28)
If ¢K2 >0, then K2 is given by (7) and K2 >®A=2 is equivalent to A <A¤. If ¢K2 = 0
then K2 =®A¤=2, then K2 < ®A=2 is equivalent to A >A¤. 2.
Proof of Proposition 8: Let
A¤
1(A) = 2±
®(1¡°)
h
1¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2+¢K1+A)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1(A)+A¡®(¢K1+A)=2)2
i
+ 2º
®(1¡°)(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1(A) +A ¡®(¢K1 +A)=2)
A¤
2(A) = 2±
®(1¡°)
h
1¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2¡¢K1¡A)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1(A)+A¡®(¢K1+A)=2)2
i
+ 2º
®(1¡°)(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1(A) +A ¡®(¢K1 +A)=2)
with
K1(A) =
°®A
2 +®(1 ¡°)
+
±(2+®)
2 +®(1 ¡°)
￿
1¡¯2(W1;1 ¡W1;2)2
(W1;1 +W1;2)2
¸
+
º(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)
(W1;1+W1;2)
(29)
De¯ne the functions F1(A) and F2(A) as follows
F1(A) =
(
F1;s(A) if A ￿ A¤
1
F1;l(A) if A >A¤
1
F2(A) =
(
F2;s(A) if A ￿ A¤
2
F2;l(A) if A >A¤
2
where
F1;l(A) =
°®A
2 +±
h
1 ¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2+¢K1+A)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1(A)+A¡®(¢K1+A)=2)2
i
+º(W2;1 +W2;2 +K1(A) +A ¡®(¢K1 +A)=2)
F1;s(A) = °®A
2+®(1¡°) +
±(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)
h
1¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2+¢K1+A)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1(A)+A¡®(¢K1+A)=2)2
i
+
º(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1(A) +A ¡®(¢K1 +A)=2)
F2;l(A) =
°®A
2 +±
h
1 ¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2¡¢K1¡A)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1(A)+A¡®(¢K1+A)=2)2
i
+º(W2;1 +W2;2 +K1(A) +A ¡®(¢K1 +A)=2)
18F2;s(A) = °®A
2+®(1¡°) +
±(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)
h
1¡¯2 (W1;1¡W1;2¡¢K1¡A)2
(W1;1+W1;2+K1(A)+A¡®(¢K1+A)=2)2
i
+
º(2+®)
2+®(1¡°)(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1(A) +A ¡®(¢K1 +A)=2)
Let
D = D1 +p1;1F1;s(A) +(1¡p1;1)F2;s(A)
where D1 and p1;1 are given by (10) and (9), respectively. Now, it is straightforward that
there exists ¹ A2 such that if A < ¹ A2, then F1(A) =F1;s(A) and F2(A) =F2;s(A). Therefore,
if A < ¹ A2, then proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 4, oneshows that if °(3¡°) > 3º,
there exists ® such that @D=@¢K1 >0. Let
¹ A1 =
2±
®(1¡°)
￿
1¡¯2(W1;1 ¡W1;2)2
(W1;1 +W1;2)2
¸
+
2º
®(1 ¡°)
(W1;1 +W1;2)
Proceeding as in the proof of proposition 7, one shows that if A < ¹ A1, then
¢K1 =
2K1(A) ¡®A
2 +®
(30)
Then, then assumption of perfect competition in thebroadcasting industry in period 1 (i.e.,
D1 = K1) implies that K1 is given by (29). Hence, taking ¹ A =Min( ¹ A1; ¹ A2), we have the
desired result. 2
Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof of part (i). From equations (14) and (15), we derive that
@¼t;i
@¹t;i(w)
=
®¢Kt;jKt;w
(¢Kt;1 +¢Kt;2)2 [(1 ¡¹t;i(w))Kt;w ¡(1 ¡¹t;i(l))Kt;l] ¡pt;iKt;w (31)
@¼t;i
@¹t;i(l)
= ¡
®¢Kt;jKt;l
(¢Kt;1 +¢Kt;2)2 [(1¡¹t;i(w))Kt;w ¡(1 ¡¹t;i(l))Kt;l] +(pt;i ¡1)Kt;l (32)
Assume that there exists an equilibrium with ¹t;i(w) > 0. This implies that
(1¡¹t;i(w))Kt;w ¡(1 ¡¹t;i(l))Kt;l > 0
In turn, this implies that @¼=@¹t;i(l) < 0 in equilibrium. Hence, ¹t;i(l) =0. Now, we need
to show that the system of equations
®¹t;j(w)
(¹t;1(w) +¹t;2(w))2 [(1¡¹t;i(w))Kt;w ¡Kt;l] ¡pt;iKt;w =0 i = 1;2 i 6=j (33)
has a solution in (0; 1) £(0; 1) which satis¯es the second order conditions of pro¯t maxi-
mization.
From equation (31), it is straightforward that if ¹t;i(l) = 0 then @2¼t;i=(@¹t;i(w))2 < 0.
Now, when ¹t;1(w) and ¹t;2(w) converge to 0 at the same speed (so that thereexists H > 0
such that H < ¹t;i(w)=¹t;j(w) (i = 1;2 and i 6= j) as when ¹t;1(w) and ¹t;2(w) converge
19to 0), then the LHS of (33) goes to in¯nity. Furthermore, for any given ¹t;i(w) > 0,
®¹t;j(w)=(¹t;1(w)+¹t;2(w))2 converges to 0 as ¹t;j(w) converges to zero. Hence, wededuce
that by continuity, there exist ¹t;1(w) and ¹t;2(w) such that the system of equations (33)
has a solution in (0; 1) £(0; 1).
Proof of part (ii): Weusea contradiction argument. Assumethat Wt;i > Wt;j and ¹t;i(w) ¸
¹t;j(w). This implies that pt;i >pt;j. From (33), it follows that
¹t;j(w)
¹t;i(w)
>
(1 ¡¹t;j(w))Kt;w ¡Kt;l
(1¡¹t;i(w))Kt;w ¡Kt;l
The LHS of this inequality is smaller than 1 while the RHS is larger than 1. Hence, the
inequality does not hold and if Wt;i >Wt;j then ¹t;i(w) <¹t;j(w).
Now, ¹t;i(w) >¹t;j(w) implies ¼t;i >¼t;j follows directly from (33).
Proof of part (iii): Let Rt =Kt=Kt;w. From (33), we deduce that
@¹t;i(w)
@Rt
=¡[¹t;j(w)(2 ¡Rt)(¹t;1(w) +¹t;2(w))]
¡1 (34)
Hence, ¹t;1(w) and ¹t;2(w) are increasing functions of Kt;w.
2
Proof of Proposition 10:
Proof of (i): From Proposition 9, we know that in each period the e®ort level is increasing
in Kw. Hence, we only need to show that (p2;1 ¡p2;2)2 is not increasing in ¢K2.
p2;1 ¡p2;2 = ®
¹2;1(w) ¡¹2;2(w)
¹2;1(w) +¹2;2(w)
+¯
W2;1 ¡W2;2
W2;1 +W2;2
Let Rt =Kt=Kt;w.
d(p2;1 ¡p2;2)
dR2
=
2(¹2;2(w)
d¹2;1(w)
dR2 ¡¹2;1(w)
d¹2;2(w)
dR2 )
(¹2;1(w) +¹2;2(w))2 (35)
From equation (34), we derive that d(p2;1 ¡p2;2)=dR2 =0. It follows that D2 is increasing
in ¢K2 and so the leagues sets ¢K2 = K2.
Proof of (ii). Assume that ® =1. In such a case,
¹2;1(w) =¹2;2(w) =
2K2;w ¡K2
3K2;w
and
e2;1 =e2;2 =
2K2;w ¡K1
12
20From part (i), we know that K2;w = K2. We deduce that
K2 =
±+º(W2;1 +W2;2)
1¡®°=6
(36)
Now, consider the problem of the league in period 1. Teams face the same problem as in
period 2. Hence,
¹1;1(w) =¹1;2(w) =
2K1;w ¡K1
3K1;w
Therefore, if team i wins in period 1, then
W2;i =W1;i +
µ
1¡
2K1;w ¡K1
3K1;w
¶
K1;w
while if it looses,
W2;i = W1;i +K1;l
We deduce that, in period 1, the league maximizes
D =(±+º(W1;1 +W1;2)(1 +
6
6¡°
) +(2K1;w ¡K1)(
°
6
¡
6º
6 ¡°
)
Hence, if °(6 ¡°) > 36º then dD=dK1;w >0. By continuity, we derive that there exists ®
such that if ®> ® dD=dK1;w >0, ¢K1 > 0. 2
The case of fully rational teams
Fully rational teamstake into account the impact of theiraction at time 1 on theirwealth in
period 2. Since probabilities of winning in period 2 and the revenue of the league in period
2 depend on teams' wealth, it follows that they take into the in°uence of their action in
period 1 on p2;1(i) and K¤
2(k; i) (k = d;jp and i = 1;2). In period 2, the problem of the
fully rational team is identical to that of a myopic team.
Formally, in period 1, fully rational team i solves the following problem
Maxp1;i
h
K1;w +p2;i(i)K¤
2;w(k; i) +(1¡p2;i(i))K¤
2;l(k;i) ¡e2;i(i)
i
+p1;i
h
K1;w +p2;i(j)K¤
2;w(k; j)+(1¡p2;i(j))K¤
2;l(k; j) ¡e2;i(j)
i
¡e1;i
(37)
with i 6= j, k = d; jp, and e2;i(m) represents the e®ort produced by team i in period 2 if
team m wins in period 1 (m = 1;2).
In the corner cases ® = 0 and ® = 1, we are able to derive closed form solution in
the e®ort game played by teams. First, if ® = 0, it is straightforward that teams do not
produce any e®ort . Hence, the problem faced by the league is identical to the case with
myopic teams. Therefore, the league sets ¢K1 = 0. If ®= 1 we have the following result.
21Proposition 11 (i) Assume that the league maximize the demand for sport and ® = 1.
Then
e1;1 =e1;2 =
(3¡°)¢K1
12
If °(3¡°) ¸ 3º the league sets ¢K1 = 5K1=6. If °(3¡°) < 3º the league sets ¢K1 = 0.
Proof: If ®=1, then
K¤
2(d;1) = K¤
2(d;2) =
3
3 ¡°
(±+º(W1;1 +W1;2 +K1 ¡e1;1 ¡e1;2))
and p2;j(i) = 1=2 (i;j = 1; 2). Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain that
the equilibrium e®ort produced by teams in period 1 is
e1;i =e1 =
(3 ¡°)¢K1
2[2(3¡°) +3º]
The objective of the league in period 1 is to maximize
D = 2
µ
° ¡
3º
3¡°
¶
e1 +
µ
1+
3
3 ¡°
¶
(±+º(W1;1 +W1;2))
Hence, if °(3¡°) <3º, the league sets ¢K1 so as to minimize the e®ort level produced by
teams, i.e., ¢K1 = 0. Conversely, if °(3¡°) >3º the leagues sets ¢K1 so as to maximize
the level of e®ort by teams, i.e.,
(3 ¡°)¢K1
2[2(3 ¡°) +3º]
=K1;l
Given that ¢K1 =2K1;w ¡K1 and K1;l = K1 ¡K1;l, we obtain
K1;w =
5(3¡°) +6º
6[(3 ¡°) +º]
We deduce that ¢K1 = 5K1=6. By continuity, it implies that if °(3¡°) > 3º, there exists
® such that if ®> ®, then ¢K1 >0. 2
From Proposition 11 we deduce that fully rational teams choose a lower e®ort level than
myopic teams. The reason is that they take into account the in°uence of their e®ort in
period 1 on the demand of period 2 through their wealth. It follows that by decreasing
their e®ort level, they increase their future wealth, hence increasing the revenue of the
league in period 2 and their expected gain in that period.
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